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ABSTRACT
The aim of this article is to briefly tackle, from a comparative
viewpoint, an academically quite overlooked topic: techniques of
enforcement of lawful judgments. Despite a gradual convergence in
many fields of law, common and civil law jurisdictions still maintain
a striking diversity in the ways in which they react to non-compliance with court judgments. Whilst in common law tradition, failure
to comply with a judicial order is considered civil contempt of court,
in civil law countries this legal institution is simply unknown. Furthermore, it is only in civil law systems that failure to comply with a
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court judgment cannot be punished by imprisonment. My key question is: what are, if any, the “cultural” reasons that could explain
this divergence of approach? First, discussing Mauro Cappelletti’s
comparative methodology, I explore whether, and to what extent,
civil contempt of court and its civilian counterparts are comparable.
Then, focusing my attention on the common law model, I argue that
many contemporary features of civil contempt can only be fully understood by looking at the particular image and unique social perception of the judge within the common law legal tradition.
Keywords: enforcement of rights, contempt of court, comparative
law methodology, comparative civil procedure, common law, civil
law
“ . . . ne pas regarder comme semblables des cas réellement différents; et ne pas regarder manquer les différences de ceux qui paroissent semblables.” 1 –Montesquieu
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, the comparative study of civil procedure and, more specifically, that of the techniques of enforcement of
legal judgments—a topic almost completely neglected in legal academia—has become of increasing importance. 2 The reason underpinning this turn lies in the fact that legal scholars have become
1. Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, Préface to 2 DE L’ESPRIT DE LOIS 229
(Roger Caillois ed., Gallimard 1951).
2. The starting “block” of this field of research can be found in the publication of the collection of essays titled TRENDS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF NONMONEY JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS (Ulla Jacobson & Jack Jacob eds., Kluwer L.
Intl. 1988). See also Konstantin D. Kerameus, Enforcement of Non-Money Judgments and Orders in a Comparative Perspective, in LAW & JUSTICE IN A
MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 107 (James
AR. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., Transnational Publishers 2002);
Konstantin D. Kerameus, Enforcement Proceedings, in XVI INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: CIVIL PROCEDURE 19 (Mauro Cappelletti
ed., Brill 2002); Michael Chesterman, Contempt: in the Common Law, But Not in
the Civil Law, 46 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 521 (1997); Carlandrea Cremonini, An
Italian Lawyer Looks at Civil Contempt: From Rome to Glastonbury, 3 CIV. JUST.
Q. 133 (1984). Less recently, but still useful, Alexander Pekelis, Legal Techniques
and Political Ideologies, 41 MICH. L. REV. 665 (1943).
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more and more aware of the importance that all legal systems governed by the rule of law must provide some effective remedy to enforce the rights that are provided by the substantive law itself.
“Treaties are nothing but scraps of paper!” 3 Indeed, the same
could well be said for judicial decisions. Except for the cases in
which judge’s statements have—as analytical philosophers would
say—a “performative” effect, 4 in the sense that they directly create
or change a legal relationship (e.g., determining personal status,
such as a divorce decree or annulment of marriage 5), judgments creating obligations always demand acts of compliance. Self-evidently,
this compliance is not always spontaneous. If it is not, the legal system must find a way to win the not-surprising judgment debtor’s
reluctance to comply with the pronouncement of the court, and to
realize, therefore, what the famous Italian civil procedure scholar
Giuseppe Chiovenda used to call “la volontà concreta della legge”
(“the concrete will of the law”). 6 From a more philosophical viewpoint, it is a common claim that coercion is central to the very idea
of law, and that coercive enforcement inevitably accompanies the
concept of rule of law. 7
Technically speaking, while judgments requiring the defendant
to pay a sum of money to the claimant simply involve the first being

3. This anecdotal phrase is said to have been exclaimed by German chancellor T. Von Bethmann Hollweg, in relation to the Treaty of London, shortly
before the World War I.
4. JOHN AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (Harv. U. Press 1962).
More recently, see MARIANNE CONSTABLE, OUR WORLD IS OUR BOND: HOW
LEGAL SPEECH ACTS (Stanford U. Press, 2014) and specifically chapter 1: How
to Do Things with Law.
5. These types of judgments are defined “transformational” by FLEMING
JAMES JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 30 (5th
ed., Foundation Press 2001), or “self-effectuating” by ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN,
ZUCHKERMAN ON CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICE, 1096 (Oxford U.
Press 2011), in the sense that they do not require enforcement proceedings (in
Italian, sentenze costitutive; in French, jugement constitutive; in German, Gestaltungsurteile).
6. GIUSEPPE CHIOVENDA, ISTITUZIONI DI DIRITTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE 249
(Jovene 1960).
7. Recently, re-stressing this point, FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF
LAW (Harv. U. Press 2015).
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forcibly stripped of his assets to pay his debt, things get more complicated in the case of non-monetary judgments, i.e., those judicial
decisions that order the defendant to do, or to abstain from doing, a
specific act (“orders of specific performance” and “prohibitory” or
“mandatory injunctions”). In those cases, without an adequate apparatus of coercive tools able to force human conduct, jurisdictional
power—as it has been wryly noted—“would be an empty illusion.” 8
Before proceeding further, let me first define what I mean,
broadly speaking, by “coercive tools” in civil proceedings. It is wellknown that the jurisprudential definition of a legal institution can
take two forms: that of the function and that of the structure. 9 From
the former perspective, coercive sanctions are procedural tools that
aim to oblige the judgment debtor (i.e., the party who has to give
performance) without the intervention of the enforcement machinery of the State with the judicial order. From the perspective of the
structure, they act by inflicting monetary or even personal penalties
(incarceration) on the claimant. In short, the rationale of coercive
means is to make non-compliance with the judicial order less convenient than compliance.
What I want to draw attention to in this article is that common
and civil law jurisdictions—despite their undeniable gradual convergence in many legal aspects 10—still radically differ in the ways
in which they react to non-compliance with court judgments. While
in common law failure to comply with a binding legal decision or
order is considered civil contempt of court, in civil law countries
this concept is totally unknown. In the common law world, willful
disobedience of court orders represents a sort of offence (as the word
8. JOHN F. DOBBYN, INJUNCTIONS IN A NUTSHELL 216 (West 1974).
9. This dichotomy to define legal institutions is owed to the great Italian
legal philosopher NORBERTO BOBBIO, DALLA STRUTTURA ALLA FUNZIONE.
NUOVI STUDI DI TEORIA GENERALE DEL DIRITTO (Laterza 2014) (1977).
10. On this trend, see THE GRADUAL CONVERGENCE: FOREIGN IDEAS,
FOREIGN INFLUENCES AND ENGLISH LAW ON THE EVE OF THE 21ST CENTURY
(Basil Markesinis ed., Oxford U. Press 1994). For a critical view, see Pierre
Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT’L. AND COMP. L.
Q. 52 (1996).
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“contempt” literally indicates) against the court itself or the public
administration and proper functioning of justice, and as such it has
to be, in a certain sense, “punished.” This becomes clear especially
if we look at the United States, where the line of demarcation between civil and criminal contempt is not so sharply drown. Conversely, in the civil law legal family, non-compliance is a matter of
significance for the enforcing party only. Breach of civil orders is
not considered a question of “public policy.” As it has been correctly
pointed out, “to the non-common lawyer the contempt power is a
legal technique which is not only unnecessary to a working legal
system, but also violates basic philosophical approaches to the relations between government bodies and people.” 11
Undoubtedly, also civil law systems have some forms of sanction or threat to compel compliance with judges’ orders—the
astreintes in France, 12 the Geldstrafen in Germany, 13 the “coercive
measure” introduced for the first time in 2009 in the Italian Code of
Civil Procedure, 14 and so forth—but they are never regarded as ways

11. Ronald Goldfarb, The History of the Contempt Power, 1 WASH. U. L. Q.
1, 2 (1961).
12. Astreintes are notoriously court orders for the payment of a fine for each
day the debtor delays compliance with the judgment. They are for the benefit of
the creditor. This model has been transplanted—in Europe—in Luxemburg, Belgium, and the Netherlands. For the French model, see ANNE LEBORGNE, VOIES
D’EXÉCUTION ET PROCÉDURES DE DISTRIBUTION 288 (Dalloz 2009); Astreinte,
VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE (Gérard Cornu ed., Press Univ. France 2005). In Belgium, see JACQUES VAN COMPERNOLLE & GEORGES DE LEVAL, L’ASTREINTE
(Larcier 2007).
13. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] (Code of Civil Procedure) § 888, 890 (Ger.).
The sum of money, unlike in the French model, is to be paid to the State (and not
to the plaintiff). For an examination of this model, see, in German, OSCAR
REMIEN, RECHTSVERWIRKLICHUNG DURCH ZWANGSGELD: VERGLEICH –
VEREINHEITLICHUNG – KOLLISIONSRECHT (Mohr 1992).
14. Italian Code of Civil Procedure, article 614-bis. For an English-language
overview, Elisabetta Silvestri, The Devil is in Details: Remarks on Italian Enforcement Procedures, in ENFORCEMENT AND ENFORCEABILITY. TRADITION AND
REFORM 207 (Remco van Rhee & Alain Uzelac eds., Intersentia 2010). In Italianlanguage, Sergio Chiarloni, L’esecuzione indiretta ai sensi dell’art. 614 bis c.p.c.:
confini e problemi, GIURISPRUDENZA ITALIANA 731 (2014); for some comparative
remarks, see also Michele Taruffo, Note sull’esecuzione degli obblighi di fare e
di non fare, GIURISPRUDENZA ITALIANA 744 (2014).
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to “vindicate” the court’s authority or its dignity. Rather, as the historical evolution shows, these kinds of coercive tools are simply designed to overcome the Roman-Latin maxim “nemo precise ad factum cogi potest” (“nobody can be forced to do a specific act” 15).
Thus, in contractual matters, they guarantee the continental principle of the supremacy of specific performance over the obligation to
pay damages. 16
Furthermore, in the continental legal tradition (France, Italy and
Spain, for instance), it is not possible to commit the unwilling debtor
to prison. In this respect, the German model is quite problematic as
it had followed a slightly different trajectory. While refusing a “personalized” and non-bureaucratic concept of judge—as it is, on the
contrary, in the common law tradition (see section V.)—in Germany, imprisonment as a way of enforcement is theoretically still
possible, although in very few and strictly limited cases, and only
when the obligation is infongible or strictly personal (i.e., when it
can be performed only by the debtor in person unvertretbare Handlung). The reason of this enduring possibility has been discussed by
historians of civil procedure. It probably represents a residual institution from the Middle Ages, and, in particular, from the fact that

15. This rule was embedded, for instance, in former article 1142 of the French
Civil Code (before the 2016 reform of contractual obligations) (“toute obligations
de faire ou de ne pas faire se résout en dommages et interêts en cas d’inexécution
de la part du débiteur,” i.e., every obligation to do or not to do is converted in the
obligation of paying damages in case of nonperformance). However, both in common and civil law tradition it is not possible to coerce the defendant into complying with orders that involve personal activities (like contracts of employment),
such as “contracts of personal service.” See generally J. Lewis Parks, Equitable
Relief in Contract Involving Personal Service, U. OF PA. L. REV., 251 (1918) or,
in the French legal system, “obligations à caractère personnel,” see Antoine
Lebois, Les obligations de faire à caractère personnel, JCP 2008, 210.
16. SOLENE ROWAN, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTECTION OF PERFORMANCE (Oxford U.
Press 2012). A classic account of this topic is that of GUENTER H. TREITEL,
REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT (Oxford U.
Press 1988). See also Shael Herman, Specific Performance: a Comparative Analysis, 7 EDINBURGH L. REV. 8 (2003). For an earlier, but still valid, analysis, John
P. Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany, 57 MICH. L. REV. 516
(1958).
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the contumacy, in its broader sense, was then considered as an offence to the authority of the king (Verletzung des Königs 17).
As the German model represents, in this hypothesis, an exception to the general rule adopted by civil law systems, it will not be
taken into consideration here. Rather, what I want to stress, from a
very general standpoint, is the fact that in civil law jurisdictions
(with, indeed, the small exception of Germany, in some cases),
courts lack the power to act in personam at all. Conversely, in common law countries, the imprisonment of the person found guilty of
civil contempt seems to be a common practice, especially in the
United States. The famous case of Beatty Chadwick is, to this extent,
emblematic: here, an American lawyer was jailed for fourteen years
in the county prison of Delaware only because he refused to disclose
to the court his assets in a matrimonial proceeding, and it is surprising to note that he would have done less time in prison if he had
simply stolen the money. 18
My key questions are: what are the reasons of this contrast?
What are the cultural factors, if any, that are able to explain and justify this discrepancy of approaches?
My article will unfold as follows. In the following part, I will
outline the methodological framework of my research, recalling the

17. In German language, J. KOHLER, Ungehorsam und Vollstreckung im Zivilprozess, ARCH. CIV. PRAX. 80, 141 (1893). For the historical analysis of this
point, see the discussion occurred between the Italian procedural law scholars
SERGIO CHIARLONI, MISURE COERCITIVE E TUTELA DEI DIRITTI 68, 72 (Giuffré
1980) and Vittorio Colesanti, Misure coercitive e tutela dei diritti, RIVISTA DI
DIRITTO PROCESSUALE 601 (1980).
18. Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2002). This case is discussed
in detail by Mitchell J. Frank, Modern Odysseus of Classic Fraud—Fourteen
Years in Prison for Civil Contempt Without a Jury Trial, Judicial Power Without
Limitations, and an Examination of the Failure of Due Process, 66 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 599 (2012). See also, on this case, WENDY MCELROY, THE ART OF BEING
FREE: POLITICS VERSUS EVERYMAN AND WOMAN 95 (Laissez Faire Books 2012).
On a wider perspective, see Doug Rendleman, Disobedience and Coercive Contempt Confinement: The Terminally Stubborn Contemnor, 48 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 185 (1991). To avoid these situations, now, in England, committal by a Superior court may only be for a maximum of two years, and only one month if the
order comes from an inferior court—Contempt of Court Act 1981, s.14(1). The
superior court power to fine is, however, unlimited.
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approach suggested by the Italian-American comparative law
scholar Mauro Cappelletti (Part II). I will then explore what is the
common function, or common need, which makes the comparison
between the civil contempt of court and its civilian counterparts possible (Part III). Then, while focusing my attention upon the AngloAmerican model of civil contempt of court, I will illustrate its most
distinctive features, contrasting them with the “continental” view
(Part VI). Finally, I will argue that those differences can be fully
explained only by looking at the different images and roles played
by judges and courts in each legal tradition (Part V). As I see it, it is
not possible to even partially understand the long-lasting presence
and enduring importance of a legal institution such as the (civil) contempt of court without taking into account the particular conception
of the judiciary and the particular “symbolic image” and “social perception” of the judge in the common law systems and, I would say,
within the Anglo-American society at large.
II. THE “COMPARABILITY” OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
Before addressing the problem shortly outlined above, I think it
would be useful to premise some short methodological remarks in
relation to the comparative law enterprise.
In my view, one of the biggest problems—if not the biggest—
for comparative law scholars is to determine what can be usefully
compared. 19 By and large, comparative law is, in a certain sense,
caught in middle of this paradox. On the one hand, it is necessary to
respect differences existing between legal systems—without alterity, the comparative law endeavor itself makes no sense. 20

19. Catherine Valcke, Comparative Law as Comparative Jurisprudence: The
Comparability of Legal Systems, 52 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 713, 720 (2004) [hereinafter Valcke, Comparability of Legal Systems]. See also Catherine Valcke, Reflections on Comparative Law Methodology—Getting Inside Contract Law, in
PRACTICE AND THEORY IN COMPARATIVE LAW, 22 (Maurice Adams & Jacco
Bomhoff eds., Oxford U. Press 2012).
20. “Comment, d’ailleurs, le comparatiste lui-même pourrait-il exister sans
l’autre?” wonders PIERRE LEGRAND, LE DROIT COMPARÉ 96 (4th ed., Presses Uni-
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On the other hand, we unavoidably need a “contact point”—or, to
use Pierre Legrand’s evocative expression, an “interface sémantique” 21—for legal cultures to communicate with each other:
“[l’]absolument autre ne pourrait être qu’indéchiffrable, c’est-àdire muet.” 22 To make a dialogue, we must speak the same language.
In short—as Catherine Valcke has summarized—comparative law,
to be possible, requires unity and plurality at once. 23
But how is it possible to combine respect for alterity and the
need for communication? How is it possible to reconcile both those
fundamental and to a certain extent, at odds requirements?
Although the literature relating to comparative law methodology
is surprisingly huge (comparative law scholars seem to be somehow
obsessed with methodological discussions 24), I would like to employ and discuss here the methodological framework suggested by
Mauro Cappelletti—one of the most prominent and internationallyrenowned voices of the last century, both in the field of comparative
law and civil procedure—as outlined in his book about civil justice
systems in comparative perspective. 25 I think his method represents
one of the best attempts to fruitfully handle this “tension” between
similarity and difference.

versitaires de France 2011). See also Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 144
(Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., Cambridge U. Press 2003), “[a] planet
with one culture would be an impoverished habitat (and a world in which comparatists have very little to do).”
21. LEGRAND, supra note 20, at 77.
22. Id. at 73.
23. See Valcke, Comparability of Legal Systems, supra note 19, at 720.
24. For an up-to-date and thorough account, see COMPARATIVE LAW
METHODOLOGY (Maurice Adams, Jaakko Husa & Marieke Oderkek eds., Edward
Elgar Pub. 2017); MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW (Cambridge U. Press
2014). A helpful critical summary (in French) is provided by Béatrice Jaluzot,
Méthodologie du droit comparé: bilan et prospective, 57 REVUE INTERNATIONALE
DE DROIT COMPARÉ 29 (2005).
25. I am referring to Mauro Cappelletti, Metodo e finalità degli studi comparativi sulla giustizia, in MAURO CAPPELLETTI, DIMENSIONI DELLA GIUSTIZIA
NELLE SOCIETÀ CONTEMPORANEE: STUDI DI DIRITTO GIUDIZIARIO COMPARATO16
(Il Mulino 1994).
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To put it roughly, according to his view, two or more legal institutions can be said “comparable” (and the comparative law endeavor
can be, thus, meaningful) not when the final legal solutions adopted
by each country are similar, but when the problem or social need the
normative intervention intended to address is the same. It is quite
evident here the reference to the functional method, the main assumption of which—as Zweigert and Kötz famously wrote—is that
“in law the only things which are comparable are those which fulfill
the same function.” 26
Attempting to bring unity to comparative law research, Mauro
Cappelletti’s first assumption is that before comparing, we first need
to find out what is the shared social problem or need legal institutions aim to respond. Secondly, in his desire to insist on differences,
he explicitly states how a purely technical description of a legal state
of affairs between two or more foreign countries does not mean
comparative law. Comparative law in its most authentic sense always involves an in-depth research of historical, sociological, ethical, ideological (in one word: cultural) reasons that can somehow
explain the divergence of legal solutions, and everyone sees how
these reasons can only be found outside the strict legal domain. 27
Admittedly, this kind of methodology also has a weak part. Indeed, the final stage of the comparative research is said to consist in
an assessment of the different legal solutions in terms of efficiency.
26. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 34 (Oxford U. Press 1998). For a critical discussion, Ralph Michaels, The
Functional Method of Comparative Law in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 339 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford U. Press 2006); Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 144 (Pierre
Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., Cambridge U. Press 2003). Recently, on functionalism, see James Gordley, Comparison, Law, and Culture: A Response to
Pierre Legrand, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 133 (2017) (special issue: What We Write
About When We Write About Comparative Law: Pierre Legrand’s Critique in Discussion).
27. Cappelletti, supra note 25, at 17–18. Those elements are dubbed the “invisible forces” by Bernhard Grossfeld & Edward J. Eberle, Pattern of Order in
Comparative Law: Discovering and Decoding Invisible Powers, 38 TEX. INT’L L.
J. 291 (2003).
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Since this claim can no longer be accepted—as it has been proven
wrong by the most recent comparative law scholarship, and by the
notion of “incommensurability” of legal traditions 28—my goal in
this article is not to say which model of coercive sanction (the civil
law or the common law one) is the best. I think that both have their
advantages and drawbacks. For one thing, continental models are
too “soft,” and could in fact lead to the “monetization” of all entitlements. On the contrary, the common law system could repress various kinds of legitimate revendications in order to preserve the legal
status quo—as it happened in those cases in which the English and
American judiciary, through the threat of contempt of court, prevented or stopped picketing and striking by trade unions in industrial
disputes. 29 Rather, I want to simply analyze and give value to the
existing enriching cultural distance between common and civil law
traditions in this academically quite overlooked legal field.
III. IN SEARCH OF THE COMMON NEED: THE PRINCIPLE OF
EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PROTECTION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
In the case of coercive sanctions in civil proceedings, it is not
difficult to see what their core function is. Basically, it is to convert
judges’ words into facts. By preventing that court decisions will not
be followed by actions, coercive sanctions enforce the “rule of law,”
generally understood as the supremacy of the law (in the case here
at stake, as embodied in a binding legal judgment) over the personal
will of people. 30

28. H. Patrick Glenn, Are Legal Traditions Incommensurable?, 49 AM. J. OF
COMP. L. 133 (2001).
29. This matter is discussed in JOHN A.G GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE
JUDICIARY 63 (5th ed., Fontana Press 1997); see also FELIX FRANKFURTER &
NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (Macmillan 1930) and William E.
Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109
(1989).
30. See, e.g., Sherry v. Gunning [2014] IEHC 411 (H. Ct.) (Ir.): “The jurisdiction of the courts to enforce their own orders is an essential aspect of the rule
of law;” United Nurses of Alberta v. Alberta (A.G.) [1992] 1 S.C.R., 901 at 931
(Can.):
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In a more detailed way, the task of all coercive tools is to enhance the so called principle of “effective judicial protection.” This
principle is not only provided now, in Europe, by art. 6(1) of the
European Convention on Human Rights—which generally protects
the right of a fair trial—but it is also a general rule which is part of
the very foundation of any system ruled by law. 31 In the narrow
sense and for my current purposes, this principle means, amid many
other things, that every legal order must provide effective means to
enforcing its judgments (especially non-pecuniary ones) and that the
remedies that courts deliver must be effective. All this has been
clearly stated by the European Court of Human Rights for the first
time in its path-breaking decision Hornsby v. Greece. 32 In this case,
Greek authorities refused to give the permission to two British citizens to open up an English language school because they did not
have Greek nationality. The Greek Supreme Administrative Court
held that this refusal was contrary to the European Law, which prevents nationality-based discriminations, and finally ordered to grant
the “specific remedy” (i.e., the permission to open up the school).
However, Greek administrative officials did not comply with this
order, and the British citizens were then only awarded damages, i.e.
a sum of money for their actual loss. The European Court of Human

The rule of law is at the heart of our society; without it, there can be
neither peace, nor order, nor good government. The rule of law is directly
dependent on the ability of the courts to enforce their process and maintain their dignity and respect. To maintain their process and respect,
courts since the 12th century have exercised the power to punish for contempt of court.
31. See Anthony Arnull, The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in EU
Law, An Unruly Horse?, 36 EUR. L. REV. 51 (2011).
32. Hornsby v. Greece, App. No. 18357/91, 1997-II Eur. Ct. H.R 613. For a
discussion of this case, GERANNE LAUTENBACH, THE CONCEPT OF THE RULE OF
LAW AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 146 (Oxford U. Press 2013).
On the rising of a real right to an effective judicial enforcement of binding
judgments, in French language, Jacques Normand, L’émergence d’un droit européen de l’exécution, in MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE JACQUES VAN
COMPERNOLLE 458 (Bruylant 2004); Jacques Van Compernolle, Le droit à l’exécution: une nouvelle garantie du procès équitable, in LE DROIT PROCESSUEL ET
JUDICIAIRE EUROPÉEN 475 (Georges De Leval & Marcel Storme eds., La Charte
2003).
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Rights then condemned Greece on the basis that Article 6 of the
Convention requires final judgments to be exactly enforced. The
Court persuasively argued that the right of access to court “would
be illusory if a Contracting State’s domestic legal system allowed a
final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party” 33 and more importantly that the “action for damages” provided by Greek statutory legislation “cannot be deemed
sufficient to remedy the applicants’ complaints” as “compensation
for non-pecuniary damage . . . would not have been an alternative
solution.” 34 Here, the mere monetary compensation was found to be
a qualitatively inadequate remedy compared to the specific relief.
I think it is quite clear that, especially after this judicial decision,
all coercive procedural devices are expected to play a crucial and
unique role in every contemporary legal system. They are, in some
ways, necessary. Without them, as Calabresi and Melamed stressed
in their influential study, “property rules” granted by law would be
converted into mere “liability rules” if the defendant can only be
forced to pay a “substituted” sum of money for having failed to comply with his/her primary duty. 35 If things were so, we could say that
the right to disobey a non-monetary judgment is obtainable by the
mere payment of a monetary penalty. 36 It is worth noting, incidentally, that this is what always happened in Italy before the ultimate introduction of the general coercive tool in 2009 in the Code
of Civil Procedure, especially in the case of judgments ordering the
abstention from doing something or ordering an activity that could
be done only by the defendant in person (i.e., infongible).

33. Hornsby v. Greece, supra note 32, at para. 40.
34. Id. at para. 37.
35. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1126
(1972): “we impose criminal sanctions as a means of deterring future attempts to
convert property rules into liability rules.”
36. “The right to disobey the law is not obtainable by the payment of a penalty
….” Francome v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [1984] 2 All ER 408 at 412
(UK).
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IV. CIVIL CONTEMPT OF COURT AND THE PRIVATE/PUBLIC DIVIDE
After having tackled the problem of the comparability between
civil contempt of court and the continental coercive tools, I would
like now to stress the divergences existing between the two, and try
to explain them.
Coherently with the approach initially adopted and focusing on
the Anglo-American model, I will leave apart the most technical aspects as well as the examination of procedural requirements or of
operating rules of civil contempt of court, and I will explore its essential characteristics, its fundamental principles, and its most “ideological” or “political” features. Indeed, contempt of court has to be
essentially seen, at least in my opinion, as an ideologically loaded
notion.
To begin, it is well-known that the purpose of civil contempt of
court (or contempt in procedure, or contempt by disobedience) is to
provide a sanction for non-compliance of theoretically any court order (interlocutory or provisional as well final, for the discovery or
production of documents, as well on the merit of the case), not only
by means of monetary penalties (i.e., sequestration of assets and
fines), but even through the incarceration of the contemnor. 37 This
possibility derives from the fact that all equity instruments (and in
particular orders of specific performance, and mandatory and prohibitory injunctions, that in ancient times only the Lord Chancellor

37. Civil contempt of court is a legal institution that exists in every common
law jurisdiction. For monographic accounts focusing on the English model, see
DAVID EADY & A.T.H. SMITH, ARLIDGE, EADY & SMITH ON CONTEMPT 892 (4th
ed., Sweet and Maxwell 2011); C. JOHN MILLER, CONTEMPT OF COURT (3d ed.,
Clarendon Press 2000); NIGEL LOWE & BRENDA SUFRIN, THE LAW OF CONTEMPT
(3d ed., Butterworths 1996); Contempt of Court, in 22 HALSBURY’S LAW OF
ENGLAND (5th ed., Adrian Zuckerman ed. 2012). For the analysis of some distinctive aspects of civil contempt in the United States, see Paul A. Grote, Purging
Contempt: Eliminating the Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 88
WASH. U. L. REV. 1247, 1269 (2011); Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345 (2000); Earl C. Dudley, Getting Beyond the
Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempt, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025 (1993).
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could grant), do not act in rem (i.e., against assets), but in personam
(i.e., directly against the debtor’s person).
“A court without contempt power is not a court.” 38 I think this
short phrase perfectly captures the main feature of the English civil
sanction, a feature that does not exist in civil law jurisdictions at all.
It expresses the very idea that the contempt power (both in its civil
and criminal form) is so innate in the concept of jurisdictional authority that a court that could not secure compliance with its own
judgments and orders is a contradiction in terms, an “oxymoron.”
Contempt power is something regarded as intrinsic to the notion of
court; even obvious, I would say. In the common lawyer’s eye, the
power of contempt “is inherent in courts, and automatically exists
by its very nature.” 39
The legal origins of the contempt of court are well rooted in history. 40 In R. v. Almon, judge Wilmot wrote: “I have examined very
carefully to see if I could find out any vestiges or traces of its introduction, but can find none. It is as ancient as any other part of the
common law, there is no priority or posteriority to be discovered
about it.” 41 Of course, such a statement must be understood as part
of that broad, now debunked, “narrative” aiming to affirm that common law has always existed, and that the English judge do not invent, but rather find out and declare pre-existing laws (that is the so
called “declaratory theory”). Nevertheless, in this case there is some
truth. Yet in the very first essay on common law, the Tractatus de
legibus et consuetudinibus regni Angliae (the famous Tractatus of
Glanville), there is a reference to the contemptus curiae, i.e., the disregard of the party who failed to appear before the King’s court, or
his justices (Curia Regis). 42
38. Lawrence N. Gray, Criminal and Civil Contempt: Some Sense of a
Hodgepodge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 337, 342 (1998).
39. Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 16.
40. On contempt of court history, see SIR JOHN CHARLES FOX, THE HISTORY
OF CONTEMPT OF COURT. THE FORM OF TRIAL AND THE MODE OF PUNISHMENT
(Oxford U. Press 1927).
41. R. v. Almon 97 E.R. 94; (1765) Wilm 243.
42. EADY & SMITH, supra note 37, at 1.
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Historically speaking, and in more detail, the contempt power
can be further explained by the development and stabilization of the
notion of “inherent jurisdiction” of English Superior Courts, a concept completely extraneous to the habits of thought of civil lawyers,
academically educated in the shadow of the dogma of the strict separation of powers. By inherent jurisdiction I mean that “reserve or
fund of powers,” without statutory foundation, “which the court may
draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so” in
order to preserve their own authoritativeness. 43 It follows that to affirm that civil contempt of court is mainly serving the plaintiff interest means to profoundly misunderstand the real nature of this institution. The main value here protected remains that of the “due
administration” of justice: “civil contempt cannot be considered
therefore merely as a means by which individuals litigants can enforce orders in their favour.” 44
Common law judges often use the concept of “public policy” to
indicate this strong public interest toward the punishment of noncompliance with their orders. As Lord Diplock clearly wrote in his
decision Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd., there is always “an element of public policy in punishing civil contempt, since
the administration of justice would be undermined if the order of
any court could be disregarded with impunity.” 45
In the common lawyer’s legal mentality, the presence of civil
contempt of court is then fundamental to the maintenance of social
order and its hypothetical elimination is often depicted in rather
apocalyptical (and often irrational) ways:

43. These words are those of Isaac H. Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the
Court, 23 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 23, 51 (1970). Now also in ISAAC H.
JACOB, THE REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURAL LAW 221 (Sweet and Maxwell 1982).
More recently, on this issue, Martin S. Dockray, The Inherent Jurisdiction to Regulate Civil Proceedings, 113 L. Q. REV. 120 (1997).
44. EADY & SMITH, supra note 37, at 893.
45. Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [1973] 3 All ER 54, 71. For
similar considerations, Mid Bedfordshire District Council v. Brown (Thomas),
[2004] EWCA Civ. 1709 [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1460.
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To allow court orders to be disobeyed—a Canadian judges
argued—would be to tread the road towards anarchy. If the
orders of Courts can be treated with disrespect, the whole
administration of justice is brought into scorn . . . . Loss of
respect for the Courts will quickly result in the destruction
of our society. 46
As a result, throughout all the common law world, the distinction
itself between civil and criminal contempt is much hazier than civil
lawyers may think. 47 In Jennison v. Backer, 48 Judge Solomon stated
that the purpose of vindicating the right of the claimant and the purpose of vindicating the court authority are “inextricably intermixed”
and that the divide between the two forms of contempt is “unhelpful
and almost meaningless.” For Lord Donaldson, in Attorney-General
v. Newspaper Publishing Ltd.,49 that distinction even “tends to mislead rather to assist.” Furthermore, as one of the most authoritative
American books on injunctions says: “contempt are neither wholly
civil nor altogether criminal.” 50
That means that the nature of civil contempt of court is always
twofold. It has both a coercive and punitive function at once. 51
46. O’Leary J., Canada Metal Co. Ltd vs. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, [1975] 48 D.L.R. 3d 649, 669. (quoted in Chesterman, supra note 2, at 521).
See also Sherry v. Gunning, supra note 30: “The orders of the court must be complied with. The alternative is anarchy in which the strong will triumph over the
weak.”
47. “The demarcation [between civil and criminal contempt] may be hazy at
best,” File v. File, 673 S.E. 2d 405 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
48. Jennison v. Backer [1972] 2 Q.B. 52, [1972] 1 All ER 997.
49. Attorney-General v. Newspaper Publishing Ltd. [1987] 3 All ER 276, 294
(CA).
50. OWEN FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 832 (2d ed., Foundation
Press 1984).
51. Gompers v. Buck’s Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). More
recently, International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821
(1994) (“contempt is a civil-criminal hodgepodge”); on this important case, see
Philip A. Hostak, International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell: A Paradigm Shift in the Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 81 CORNELL
L. REV. 181 (1995); Linda Mullenix, Clarifying the Distinction between Civil and
Criminal Contempt: Problems of Prospective Penalties and Excessive Fines, 3
Preview of Supreme Court Cases 87 (University of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 360, 1993): “Elements of punitive as well remedial punishment
are almost invariably present in every civil contempt.” Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d
759, 764 (Alaska 1971) (quoting Grote, supra note 37, at 1256 n.71).
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In other words, one could say that the purpose of civil contempt of
court, in most cases, is both backward-looking (used to punish past
acts of disobedience) and forward-looking (used to compel obedience). It always has a “punitive” flavour. For these reasons civil contempt is often said to be a “quasi-criminal” wrong, and to “partake
of a criminal nature.” 52 It coherently follows, for example, that the
standard of proof is the criminal one of “beyond any reasonable
doubt” and not the civil one of “balance of probabilities.”
What it should be emphasized here is that such affirmations
would be simply unthinkable in a civil law jurisdiction, where private and criminal (public) law are understood as two legal fields well
separated and never overlapping and that is why, for instance, civil
law courts cannot award punitive damages. 53 In the civil law legal
culture, unlike in the common law one, the distinction between what
counts as (private) tort and what counts as (public) crime has always
been quite sharply drawn. 54
Yet from these brief observations it is therefore possible to unveil the profound difference between civil contempt of court and its
civilian counterparts. Indeed, the idea that non-compliance with
court orders represents, in some ways, a public offence toward the
court is simply foreign to civil law scholar’s eye. As Alexander
Pekelis (an Italian-American civil procedural scholar of the last century) remarked:
This very concept of contempt simply does not belong to the
world of ideas of a Latin lawyer. It just does not occur to him
52. In re Bramblevale Ltd, [1970] 1 ch. 128 (C.A.), per Lord Denning, M.R.
at. 137.
53. On this comparison, Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L. J. 1795, 1804 (1992).
Recently, this issue has been investigated from a comparative perspective by
Marco Cappelletti, Punitive Damages and the Public/Private Distinction: A Comparison Between the United States and Italy, 32 ARIZ. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 799
(2015). See also Helmut Koziol, Punitive Damages–A European Perspective, 68
LA L. REV. 741 (2008).
54. For an analysis of the historical roots of such a difference, David J. Seipp,
The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 BUFFALO
U. L. REV. 59 (1996).
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that the refusal of the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff a
painting sold to the latter . . . may, as soon as judicial order
is issued, become a matter to a certain extent personal to the
court, and that the court may feel hurt, insulted, “contemned,” because its order has been neglected or willfully
disobeyed. 55
Now, no doubt that in contemporary times, Anglo-American
judges do not feel personally “offended” or “insulted” by the
debtor’s non-compliance with its orders. But nonetheless it is true
that only in civil law countries, what happens after the final judgment is conceived as a mere chose des parties (i.e., a private matter
between the parties) and do not involve the judicial authority in its
essence.
V. EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCES: TWO REMARKS ABOUT THE
IMAGE OF THE COMMON LAW JUDGE
My claim is that it is possible to fully understand the nature and
character of civil contempt of court only by looking at the high social prestige of the judiciary in the common law jurisdictions, vis-àvis civil law jurisdictions. 56 In the words of Konstantinos Kerameus—one of the few procedural legal scholars that has dealt with
the enforcement proceedings in comparative perspective—the regime of civil contempt “transcends the field of the enforcement by
… exalting the function of courts within society at large.” 57
I believe, in other words, that there is a sort of correspondence,
a connection, or at least an influence, between the, so to say, “zero
tolerance” for disobedience with judicial orders (well expressed by
the civil contempt of court doctrine) and the symbolic image, or the
“social perception,” of common law judges. Basically, while in
common law jurisdictions judges are characterized by a high social
55. Pekelis, supra note 2, at 668; Chesterman, supra note 2, at 541.
56. This idea is not totally new; see, e.g., GILLES CUNIBERTI, Grands systèmes de droit contemporains 124 (2d ed., L.G.D.J. 2011): “[l]a stature du juge
anglais n’est peut-être pas étrangère au développement d’une institution propre
aux droits de Common law sanctionnant la désobéissance aux ordres judiciaires.”
57. Kerameus, supra note 2, at 117.
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prestige, and the judiciary function is strongly “personalized,” 58 on
the contrary, in continental legal culture, judges are essentially seen
as de-personalized, anonymous, bureaucratic figures that completely lack that “paternal authority” that characterizes their common law counterparts.
Although this point merits a deeper reflection, which goes beyond the scope of this article, I think that at least two kinds of historical justification can be advanced. The first is, I would say, “institutional.” It deals with the fact that, in England, the authority of
the judiciary is historically derived from the Sovereign’s powers. I
am aware that this is, in some ways, true also in relation to the civil
law jurisdictions, at least at the beginning of their evolution. But
whilst the recent developments of the continental legal culture are
marked by a complete rupture with the previous legal order, due especially to the French Revolution and its strongly “anti-judicial”
ideology, in England there is no a real, commonly-recognized
boundary between the Middle Ages and modern times—it is wellknown that the gradual development of common law is better described by the idea of “continuity” than that of “separation.” 59
In late Anglo-Saxon times, the King was described as the fountain of all justice. According to the famous Blackstone’s metaphor,
58. This feature is well exemplified, for instance, by the fact that, in common
law legal culture, the style in which legal decisions are written (their “aesthetic”)
is rich and strongly “recognizable” (think emblematically of Lord Denning’s
opening lines, like the famous one in Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40 at 42: “It
happened on April 19, 1964. It was bluebell time in Kent,” and in many other
judgments). Besides, each common law judge in the decision-making process expresses themselves in the first person, and is entitled to write their dissenting or
concurring opinion—to clearly stress how the reasoning is to be intended as the
product of their own mind and nothing else. In contrast, a French sentence is short,
written in a highly technical and “impersonal” jargon that completely lacks any
rhetorical force or literal beauty. Here the message implicitly conveyed is that it
is neither a person nor a group of people speaking, but just the invisible will of
the law, which has no face. On this topic, see Mitchel Lasser, Judicial (Self-)Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1326 (1995);
for a more general discourse, see MITCHEL LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY (Oxford U. Press
2004).
59. NICOLA PICARDI, LA GIURISDIZIONE ALL’ALBA DEL TERZO MILLENNIO 53,
61 (Giuffrè 2007).
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jurisdiction was lake water: “[t]he course of justice flows from the
King in large streams. As those streams run through his courts, justice is subdivided into smaller channels . . . till the whole and every
part of the kingdom were plentifully watered and refreshed.” 60 Sovereigns themselves could take part personally in their own courts. In
this picture, the King delegated his power to carry out justice to
judge, that they were nothing but the “impersonification” of the Sovereign in the realm. Although only in a symbolic way, all this can be
seen still today. The High Court is Her Majesty’s High Court. The
Law Courts, i.e., the London building that houses the High Court
and the Court of Appeal, is called the Royal Courts of Justice. The
judges are Her Majesty’s judges. 61 In the United Kingdom, all jurisdiction still formally derives from the Crown, and justice is carried
out in its name. 62 In such a legal context, it was quite clear that disregard towards judges meant disregard toward the King himself, and
to disobey equity orders issued by the Lord Chancellor (who was
dubbed as the “keeper of the King’s conscience”) meant nothing but
an indirect disobedience to the Monarch. 63
On the contrary, in civil law countries, coercive measures have
developed only as means of guaranteeing the specific performance
(exécution en nature in French, Naturalherstellung in German,
esecuzione in natura in Italian) of every obligation—a principle that
descends from the “natural law” and moral maxim “pacta sunt

60. These words are quoted by Paul D. Halliday, Blackstone’s King, in REINTERPRETING BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: A SEMINAL TEXT ON NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS 175 (Wilfred Prest ed., Oxford U. Press 2014).
61. JACK JACOB, THE FABRIC OF ENGLISH CIVIL JUSTICE 205 (Sweet & Maxwell 1987).
62. The official website of the Royal Family still mentions this;
see https://perma.cc/K5RS-XZHV.
63. Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 8 (“[t]he courts of early England acted for the
king through the realm. And their exercise of contempt powers derived from a
presumed contempt of king’s authority”). This point is highlighted also by John
H. Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARV. L. REV. 161, 162
(1908); remembering that, during the case of the committal of Prince Henry for
contempt, the Chief Justice Gascoyn said, “I keep here the place of the king, your
sovereign lord and father, to whom ye owe double obedience.”
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servanda” (literally translated: promises must be kept) and that traditionally do not belong to the common law legal tradition, at least
in the field of contract law. 64
The second observation, in terms of “political theology,” has to
do with the religious derivation of all legal professions and of the
community of jurists as an élite in the common law world. Indeed,
at least until late in the Middle Ages, the King of England was
named as the “earthly living image of Christ” or “Vicar of God.” 65
It is no surprise, therefore, if those features were transferred from
the Sovereign to judges, who still remain today—in the mode of
thought of the common law lawyer—the “priests” of justice (common law scholars often think of judges in theological terms). 66 The
implied syllogism was this: if the Monarch represents the image of
God on earth, and judges represent the King, then people have to
obey judges as they somehow represent God. 67 Moreover, until the
16th century, the Lord Chancellor, who exercised jurisdiction in civil

64. “The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you
must pay damages if you do not keep it—and nothing else” is the famous phrase
owed to Oliver W. Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 472
(1897).
65. In the Italian legal scholarship, this topic has been thoroughly explored
by CRISTINA COSTANTINI, LA LEGGE E IL TEMPIO. STORIA COMPARATA DELLA
GIUSTIZIA INGLESE (Carocci 2007). The appellation of “Vicar of God” of early
Norman kings, as well its influence of the discipline of contempt are underlined
by Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 7.
66. See Philip Soper, Metaphor and Models of Law: The Judge as a Priest,
75 MICH. L. REV. 1196, 1209 (1977). See also Larry C. Backer, Retaining Judicial
Authority: A Preliminary Inquiry on the Dominion of Judges, 12 WM & MARY
BILL RTS J. 117 (2003) (quoting Lewis H. LaRue, How Not To Imitate John Marshall, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819, 836 (1999): “Judges are priest, not prophets”). See also PAUL RAFFIELD, IMAGES AND CULTURES OF LAW IN EARLY
MODERN ENGLAND: JUSTICE AND POLITICAL POWER 1558–1660 7 (Cambridge U.
Press 2004), where the judicial function is dubbed secular priesthood. Judicial
function has been defined as secular papacy by Ronald Dworkin, The Secular
Papacy, in JUDGES IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY: AN INTERNATIONAL
CONVERSATION 79 (J. Stephen Breyer & Robert Badinter eds., NYU Press 2004).
JOHN P. DAWSON, Introduction to THE ORACLE OF LAW at xi (U. of Mich. Press
1967) speaks of a “mythic aura of sanctity” of judges.
67. For this line of reasoning, see David Marrani, Confronting the Symbolic
Position of the Judge in Western European Legal Traditions: A Comparative Essay, 3 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 45 (2010).
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matter, had always been a high ecclesiastic dignitary, and his procedural devices and techniques were those used in ecclesiastical
courts.
On the contrary, in civil law jurisdictions, judges are no longer
seen as “cultural heroes or parental figures” as “their image is that
of a civil servant who performs important but essentially uncreative
functions.” 68
In relation to the civil contempt of court, all that has been said
can be perceived from the highly revelatory point of view of the language. Words such as “disobedience,” “purging” (i.e., that sort of
confession of guiltiness, where the wrongdoer must admit before the
court his misconduct, acknowledge the breach of the order, express
his regret and show a “suitable remorse” 69), “debarment” (i.e., the
formal exclusion of the contemnor from the legal proceeding), all
evoke concepts such as “sin” and “redemption,” that seem more
strongly to belong to the religious sphere (or to that of the “fatherson” relationship), than to the field of the administration of justice. 70
To this extent, John Merryman, one of the most foremost American comparative law scholars, and learned expert of civil law systems, in specifically assessing the absence of the civil contempt of
court in the continental systems, lucidly wrote that the parties, in the
common law legal proceedings, play out their role before the
“father-judge,” and that the whole procedure is “permeated by a

68. JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE
AND LATIN AMERICA 37 (Stanford U. Press 2007) (1969).
69. Catherine O’Regan, Contempt of Court and the Enforcement of the Labor
Injunctions, 54 MOD. L. REV. 385, 397 (1991). For the need of a “suitable remorse” of the contemnor, see Enfield London Borough Council v. Mahoney
[1983] 1 WLR 749.
70. Pekelis, supra note 2, at 669, describing the common law “judicial thinking”:
he just disobeyed—a term that for a Latin lawyer’s ear is likely to suggest
a parent-child relation, rather than a court-party relation—he has disobeyed the court, he has been a bad boy, and he has to stand in the corner
until he changes his mind. Nothing mysterious about it!
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moralistic flavour”—and of course the Protestant ethic may have
played a great role in this. 71
On the contrary, in the civil law legal tradition, given that the
judge merely is “an important public servant, but he lacks anything
like measure of authority and paternal character possessed by the
common law judge,” parties and witnesses “can disobey his orders
with less fear of serious reprisal.” This is because the civil law legal
culture is “thoroughly secularized, less moralistic, and more immune to the ethic of the time and place.” 72
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, my article aimed at demonstrating how civil contempt of court is an institution that cannot exist but in the common
law legal tradition, and that its presence in common law jurisdictions, and conversely its absence in civil law countries, is totally understandable. Civil contempt is to be understood as a by-product,
historically determined, of a particular and unique fashion to conceive and consider the function of the judge and its position within
the legal system. In common law legal orders, the judge has always
been at the center of the legal experience, and there is no surprise
that his judgments and orders are so intensely protected. While in
the civil law culture the judge is merely conceived as an impersonal
institution applying pre-existing laws, in the common law tradition
he has been the creator of legal rules, conceived therefore as a real
person, whose pronouncements and orders prompted the advancement and development of the law. The disobedience of his words
was therefore a disobedience, and thus a contempt, directed to his
persona:

71. MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 68, at 124. See also, speaking of the common law as a system influenced by Protestantism in this field, Sergio Chiarloni, Ars distinguendi e tecniche di attuazione dei diritti, RIVISTA DI
DIRITTO PROCESSUALE 768 (1988).
72. MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 68, at 124.
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Dans l’imaginaire de common law, la justice est le fait d’une
personne plutôt que d’une institution. C’est pourquoi la personnalisation de la fonction judiciaire semble infiniment
plus importante que sur le continent, où la justice se conçoit
plutôt comme une administration. L’unité de référence n’est
pas la même : un individu dans un cas, une institution, dans
l’autre […] La théorie positiviste, révolutionnaire et antijudiciaire conçoit le juge comme un automate; elle lui refuse
toute contribution personnelle à la création du droit […]
Pour la common law, la justice procède d’une décision rendue par un homme. 73
This excerpt, in my opinion, perfectly sums up why in the common law legal tradition failure to comply with judicial decisions is
a quasi-criminal wrong, sanctioned even by imprisonment.
Overall, on a more general scale, my short analysis aimed at
drawing attention to the fact that, in comparative endeavors, we have
to focus not only on the points of convergence between legal institutions but, most importantly, on those of divergence, especially in
the field of civil procedure and dispute resolution mechanisms,
where legal tools are—more than anywhere else—deeply influenced
by historical and cultural conditions. Cultural distance is, indeed,
something that should be praised, not eliminated. Cultural distance
is an enriching component of comparative research that empowers
our mutual understanding of law and legal institutions, and as such
it should be emphasized, rather than underestimated or avoided, and
explained, rather than taken for granted. This is, I think, the true
mission of comparative scholars: “valoriser la singularité juridique
. . . travailler avec acharnement à l’entendement du singulier,” and,
at the same time, “refuser . . . la comparaison musarde, mécaniste,
calculatrice, affairiste,” always bearing in mind that “la comparaison des droits sera culturelle ou ne sera pas.” 74

73. ANTOINE GARAPON & IOANNIS PAPADOPOULOS, JUGER EN AMÉRIQUE ET
FRANCE : CULTURE JURIDIQUE FRANÇAIS ET COMMON LAW 159 (Odile Jacob
2003).
74. These beautiful words are those of LEGRAND, supra note 20, at 125.
EN

